Monday, October 5, 2015

Why I'm not a materialist

I'm a programmer. Years ago someone asked me, "what is a program?" I gave the conventional answer, that it's a set of instructions for a computer to do something. But even then I knew that it wasn't a very good answer. Is it the deck of cards in my hand (this was a long time ago)? Is the the source that I edit? The translated executable? The state of the memory of the computer when the program is running?

And if I copy the deck of cards, do I have two programs now? No, only one; just two copies of the same program. So a program is not a tangible, material thing. It is an idea. It is super-material, something I can recognize it when I see it as a material instance but not the instance itself. What would a materialist say? It's epiphenomenal: a by product of brain states. Now that's a kludge if I've every seen one.

You can say the same things about a book, by the way. Paperback and hardback editions are copies of the same book. There's only one book though lots of copies. So am I an idealist in the philosophic sense? Probably not. There are problems with that too. Rather, there's a mystery in the relationship between mind and body that we will probably never understand; and so there is a mystery in body, soul and spirit, in the three persons of the trinity, in the unity of a woman with a man in marriage, in friendship bonds that span decades, in the love of a mother for her children. It is something that somehow involves relationship: I am made in the image of God and fundamentally God is the One who relates. Another mystery.

At any rate, I'm not a materialist who believes that what's we can see and touch is all there is. We live in a world of mystery and walk through it as though we understand it. Yet in the end we never can and must yield ourselves to this reality and embrace it.

1 comment:

  1. LeRoy here. Excellent. Most of reality is invisible, yet we somehow stay fixated on the tangible and try to explain away all of the mystery that even resides in that.

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